Clinical ethics consultation has become an important resource, but unlike other health care disciplines, it has no accreditation or accepted curriculum for training programs, no standards for practice, and no way to measure effectiveness. The Clinical Ethics Credentialing Project was launched to pilot‐test approaches to train, credential, privilege, and evaluate consultants.

In “Surmounting Elusive Barriers: The Case for Bioethics Mediation,” Bergman argues that professionals trained in bioethics, reluctant to acquire the skills of mediation, would better be replaced by a cadre of mediators with some bioethics knowledge, to which I respond, “yes . . . but.”.

A theodicy is the attempt to discern God's reasons for permitting evil, whereas the antitheodicy view rejects all such attempts outright. This chapter explores two sets of arguments that could be offered in support of antitheodicy. The first group of arguments concerns the morality of theodicy, and seeks to show that theodicy‐making conflicts with or undermines central aspects of morality – for example, the motivation to fight against gratuitous evil. The second group of arguments point out nonmoral (e.g., conceptual or (...) metaphysical) failings in theodicy, such as the unduly anthropomorphic notion of God usually at work in theodicies. (shrink)

"Philosophy in Australia and New Zealand has been experiencing, for some time now, something of a 'golden age'. This is not to overlook, however, the rich philosophical past of Australasia, which - although heavily indebted to overseas trends - has managed to produce much distinctive and highly original work. These developments in the recent and distant past only serve to highlight the importance of documenting Australasia's great contribution to philosophy ... The Companion contains a wide range of encyclopaedia-like entries written (...) by leading philosophers, including biographical essays on selected philosophers, topics (existentialism, postmodernism etc) and controversies (e.g. the Orr case and the Sydney push), as well as shorter entries on associations, research centres, departments, journals, pedagogy, and international links. Important philosophical contributions made by those working outside of the academy are also included, as are the many inroads that have recently been made with the introduction of philosophy into the wider community (for example, in primary and secondary schools, and in various community-based forums such as the 'Socratic Dialogues' and 'Philosophy Cafes'). Despite, therefore, the concentration on institutionalised forms of philosophy in Australasia, due (if not overdue) recognition is also given to other aspects of Australasian philosophy."--publisher website. (shrink)

In responding to Peter Forrest’s defence of ‘tough-minded theodicy’, I point to some problematic features of theodicies of this sort, in particular their commitment to an anthropomorphic conception of God which tends to assimilate the Creator to the creaturely and so diminishes the otherness and mystery of God. This remains the case, I argue, even granted Forrest’s view that God may have a very different kind of morality from the one we mortals are subject to.

Idolatry is vehemently rejected by the Abrahamic faiths (Judaism, Christianity, and Islam), and closely connected with idolatry are certain varieties of anthropomorphism, which involve the attribution of a human form or personality to God. The question investigated in this paper is whether a highly anthropomorphic conception of God, one that commits the sin of idolatry, is entailed by a particular theory of religious language. This theory is the 'univocity thesis', the view that, for some substitutions for 'F', the sense of (...) '___ is F' as applied to God and its sense as applied to human creatures is exactly or substantially the same. My claim is that the univocity thesis entails a strong form of anthropomorphism that in effect reduces God to creaturely status and thus succumbs to idolatry (albeit a conceptual form of idolatry). In the course of my argument, a comparison is made between, on the one hand, the methods of Duns Scotus and modern proponents of perfect-being theology in arriving at a concept of God as maximally perfect, and on the other hand the work of Thomistic philosophers (especially Barry Miller) in showing how a more adequate conception of divinity can be reached by dispensing with some of the methods and assumptions of perfect-being theology, particularly the assumption of univocity. (shrink)

An aspect of the question of the relationship between reason and faith concerns the compatibility between philosophy and religious commitment. I begin by considering some attempts that have been made in both the analytic and Continental traditions to divorce philosophy from the life of religious faith as far as possible: in particular, I discuss Martin Heidegger’s critique of the very idea of a ‘Christian philosophy’ and Bertrand Russell’s criticism of Aquinas for not living up to the Socratic ideal of following (...) the argument wherever it leads. I then seek further to develop these criticisms by reviewing the current debate around the problem of evil in philosophy of religion as a case study of the dangers and drawbacks of religious commitment in philosophy. I conclude with some comments on the connection between ideology and philosophy, and claim that much of what passes as Christian philosophy is ideological as opposed to rational or truth-seeking in character. (shrink)

В книге исследуется острая проблема совместной эволюции (коэволюции) Человека и Природы, условий выживания людей и окружающей среды, перспективы развития ноосферы – биосферы и Разума.

Voprosy filosofii is publishing V. I. Danilov-Danil'ian's article "Is the ‘Coevolution of Nature and Society’ Possible?" in which he discusses at the same time the problems of sustainable development. It is a well-written, sharp polemic directed against my use of the concept "coevolution of nature and society." The article is reads easily and contains many interesting ideas. I believe it will spark the reader's interest, especially as it contains a number of debatable assertions, and may be regarded as the opening (...) of a debate on the problem of the coevolution of nature and society. A number of my works on this issue have been published and the fullest exposition of my position is contained in the monograph Sovremmenyi ratsionalizm, published in 1995. (shrink)

The active transition to digital civilization coincided with the pandemic of the new coronavirus. It can be assumed that it was the pandemic that accelerated this process. In any case, people immediately faced to new phenomena, which can affect both physical and social health. Many phenomena, including both digitalization and pandemic, have not been explained and properly assessed yet. Absence of proper explanation and assessment creates a fertile field for insurance, doubts and mistakes. Therefore at the present time the evaluative (...) and explanatory role of bioethics is invaluable. But a paradoxical situation arises: the more bioethics help is needed, the less attention is paid to its development. The transfer of bioethics study for medical students into a distance format eliminates its communicative meanings and deprives future doctors of the opportunity to develop skills and competencies in medicine. Something must be done in order not to lose the achievements of the national training system in the field of bioethics. Certain suggestions are expressed in the article. (shrink)

The article traces the forty-year history of the establishment of the Bioethics training course at the Volgograd State Medical University, which turns 85 this year. It is told about those who played a major role in the development of bioethics as a training course, what difficulties and successes were along this path. The logic of the institutionalization of bioethics through the creation of ethical examination procedures is traced. Actual problems of bioethics, as well as ongoing bioethical activities are not covered (...) and are not called, since the materials of the anniversary issue of the journal are devoted to them. (shrink)

Questions of style are often deemed of marginal importance in philosophy, as well as in metaphilosophical debates concerning the analytic/Continental divide. I take issue with this common tendency by showing how style – suitably conceived not merely as a way of writing, but as a form of expression intimately linked to a form of life – occupies a central role in philosophy. After providing an analysis of the concept of style, I take a fresh look at the analytic/Continental division by (...) examining the various stylistic differences between philosophers on each side. Despite these differences, I argue, both sides of the divide suffer from a common stylistic deficiency, and if this deficiency were rectified the gulf separating the two traditions may not appear as insurmountable as it presently does. To show this, I draw principally from the philosophy of religion, a field that has recently experienced a renewal in both the analytic and Continental traditions. (shrink)

The problem of evil is regularly regarded as posing a serious threat to theistic belief. However, contemporary philosophers of religion have overlooked the ways in which this problem has been, or could be, handled by theists committed to the metaphysics of idealism. In seeking to redress this lacuna, I turn to the systems of the British idealists, popular in the late nineteenth century though now out of favour, and in particular the work of F.H. Bradley, while also drawing parallels with (...) the Advaita Vedanta school of Hinduism. The central argument of this paper is that these idealist traditions have greater resources to adequately deal with the problem of evil than comparatively mainstream theist views. While standard forms of theism struggle to make sense of the facts of evil, or are even resoundly defeated by them, the conception of divinity suggested or developed by the British idealists offers possibilities for innovative and fruitful ways of thinking about the relationship between God and evil. (shrink)